In the middle of the last century, as the United States and Russia rapidly amassed thousands of nuclear weapons, China stayed out of the arms race, focusing its energy on growing its economy and broadening its regional influence.

上世纪中叶，美国和俄罗斯迅速积累了数千枚核武器，而中国却置身于军备竞赛之外，将精力集中在发展经济和扩大地区影响力上。

Beijing did build hundreds of nuclear weapons during those years, but the nation’s leaders insisted their modest arsenal was merely for self-defense. Since China’s first nuclear weapons test, in 1964, the country has pledged loudly to never go first in a nuclear conflict — no matter what. That stance, coupled with a stated strategy of “minimum” deterrence, didn’t demand the level of American fear, loathing and attention that the Russian threat did.

在那些年里，北京确实制造了数百枚核武器，但中国领导人坚称，他们的武器库规模不大，只是为了自卫。自1964年中国首次进行核武器试验以来，中国一直高声承诺，无论发生什么情况，永远不会首先使用核武器。这种立场，再加上“最低限度”威慑的既定战略，并没有像俄罗斯的威胁那样引起美国人的恐惧、厌恶和关注。

Now there is increasing unease in Washington about China’s nuclear ambitions. The Pentagon says Beijing is on track to double the number of its nuclear warheads by the decade’s end, to 1,000 from 500 — a development that senior U.S. officials have publicly called “unprecedented” and “breathtaking.” China has drastically expanded its nuclear testing facility and continued work on three new missile fields in the country’s north, where more than 300 intercontinental ballistic missile silos have recently been constructed.

China’s transformation from a small nuclear power into an exponentially larger one is a historic shift, upending the delicate two-peer balance of the world’s nuclear weapons for the entirety of the atomic age. The Russian and American arsenals — their growth, reduction and containment — have defined this era; maintaining an uneasy peace between the two countries hinged on open communication channels, agreement on nuclear norms and diplomacy.

中国从一个小型持核国转变为一个核大国是历史性的转变，它颠覆了整个原子时代世界微妙的核武器两强平衡。俄罗斯和美国的核武库——它们的增长、削减和遏制——定义了这个时代；维持两国之间不稳定的和平取决于开放的沟通渠道、核规范的协议和外交。

Little of that nuclear scaffolding exists with China. In Washington, how exactly to interpret Beijing’s sharp nuclear buildup is still a matter of debate. At best, American officials say, their Chinese counterparts are trying to catch up with the United States and Russia, which still each have roughly a 10-to-1 nuclear advantage over China with their stockpiles. At worst, they say, this is Beijing’s boldfaced attempt to deter the United States from defending Taiwan against a Chinese invasion, the most likely flashpoint for an armed conflict between the competing superpowers.

中国几乎不存在这种核框架。在华盛顿，如何准确解读北京急剧的核建设仍是一个有争议的问题。美国官员说，在最好的情况下，这说明中国官员正在努力赶上美国和俄罗斯——美俄两国的核储备对中国保持着大约10比1的优势；在最坏的情况下，他们认为，这是北京在大张旗鼓地试图阻止美国保护台湾不受中国入侵，而台湾最有可能成为美中两个相互竞争的超级大国之间发生武装冲突的导火索。

In truth, no one knows what China is planning. President Xi Jinping’s government, as with much of its domestic policy, releases vanishingly little information about its nuclear intentions, strategies or goals, and it has been equally unwilling to engage on arms control.

事实上，没有人知道中国在计划什么。与对待国内政策的方式一样，习近平主席的政府很少公布有关其核意图、战略或目标的信息，同样也不愿意参与军备控制。

That is, until now.

直到现在才开始改变。

In February, in a rare offer for nuclear diplomacy, China openly invited the United States and other nuclear powers to negotiate a treaty in which all sides would pledge never to use nuclear weapons first against one another. “The policy is highly stable, consistent and predictable,” said Sun Xiaobo, director general of the Chinese foreign ministry’s Department of Arms Control, in Geneva on Feb. 26. “It is, in itself, an important contribution to the international disarmament process.”

今年2月，中国罕见地提出开展核外交，公开邀请美国和其他核大国就一项条约进行谈判，在该条约中，各方承诺永远不会首先对彼此使用核武器。2月26日，中国外交部军控司司长孙晓波在日内瓦表示：“这一政策保持高度的稳定性、连续性和透明性，其本身就是对国际核裁军进程的重要贡献。”

The invitation came as a surprise. While Beijing has long claimed moral superiority over other nuclear powers on this issue — China and India are the only nuclear-armed nations to declare a no-first-use policy — opening the possibility for talks in such a public way is something China hasn’t done in years.

这个邀请来得很意外。虽然北京长期以来一直声称在这个问题上比其他核大国更有道德优势——中国和印度是仅有的两个宣布不首先使用核武器政策的核国家——但以这种公开方式开启谈判是中国多年来从未做过的事情。

It may seem like a no-brainer to take China up on the offer — wouldn’t it be better if everyone agreed not to be the first to use their nuclear weapons? — but it has been met with public silence from Washington. For American policymakers, committing to no-first-use is deeply divisive. The United States, the only nation to ever use nuclear weapons in conflict, when it dropped two atomic bombs on Japan in 1945, has never ruled out being first to use them again, nor has it detailed the circumstances under which it would consider doing so. This approach of calculated ambiguity is intended to prevent adversaries from taking military action against the United States — and the more than 30 allies it is bound by treaties to defend — out of fear for what could come their way in response.

接受中国的提议似乎是理所当然的——如果每个国家都同意不首先使用核武器，那不是更好吗——但华盛顿在公开层面上却对此保持沉默。对于美国决策者来说，承诺不首先使用核武器会引发严重分歧。美国是唯一在冲突中使用过核武器的国家，1945年曾在日本投下两颗原子弹。它从未排除再次首先使用核武器的可能性，也没有详细说明在何种情况下会考虑这样做。这种经过深思熟虑的模棱两可是为了令对手担心美国可能采取的反应，从而不会对美国——以及它受条约约束要保护的30多个盟国——采取军事行动。

It’s also a personal issue for President Biden. He supported a no-first-use policy as vice president amid deliberations inside the Obama administration, and as a presidential candidate on the campaign trail he said the “sole purpose” of the U.S. nuclear arsenal should be aimed at deterring or retaliating against an adversary’s nuclear attack. But when it came time for his own administration to adopt a declaratory nuclear policy, he decided not to break with America’s longstanding nuclear dogma and retained the first-use option.

这也是拜登总统本人的问题。在担任副总统的时候，他在奥巴马政府内部的讨论中支持不首先使用核武器的政策；在竞选总统的时候，他表示美国核武库的“唯一目的”应该是威慑或者报复对手的核攻击。但当轮到他自己的政府拿出一项宣言式的核政策时，他决定不打破美国长期以来的核原则，保留首先使用核武器的选择。

Mr. Biden’s about-face was a sign of the times, a result of both internal deliberations and consultations with allies in Europe and Asia. According to current and former administration officials, these nations’ leaders feared a U.S. policy reversal would undermine confidence in America’s commitment to come to their defense and would potentially embolden China, Russia and North Korea.

拜登的转变是时代的标志，是内部讨论以及与欧洲、亚洲盟友磋商的结果。据现任和前任政府官员称，这些国家的领导人担心政策逆转会动摇人们对美国防卫承诺的信心，并有可能让中国、俄罗斯和朝鲜更加胆大妄为。

The uneasiness surrounding a potential change to America’s first-use policy almost certainly played a role in China’s unusually public invitation to negotiate. China may simply be trying to stoke anxieties among American allies and partners — and particularly Taiwan, South Korea and Japan — by floating a public offer outside of private diplomatic channels.

围绕美国首先使用核武器政策可能生变的不安，几乎可以肯定是中国异常公开地发出谈判邀请背后的原因之一。中国在私下外交渠道之外公开提议，可能只是想煽起美国的盟友和伙伴的焦虑情绪，尤其是台湾、韩国和日本。

It’s not the first time it has gone down this road. During the Cold War, China made offers for a mutual no-first-use pledge at the United Nations in 1971 and 1982, and presented a draft treaty in 1994 to the other nuclear weapons states. Four years later, China tried to persuade President Bill Clinton to change American nuclear policy when he visited Beijing, but Mr. Clinton decided against it, choosing instead to share a pledge to stop targeting each other with their nuclear weapons.

这不是它第一次这么做。冷战期间，中国分别于1971年和1982年在联合国提出不首先使用核武器的共同承诺，并于1994年向其他核武器国家提交了条约草案。四年后，中国在克林顿总统访问北京时试图说服他改变美国的核政策，但克林顿决定不这样做，而是选择共同承诺停止用核武器瞄准对方。

Such overtures have all but halted under the leadership of Mr. Xi, who has pursued a far more aggressive foreign policy. He has overseen a sweeping modernization of China’s military, including developing and fielding new nuclear-capable missiles, submarines and bombers. Meanwhile, the stockpile of warheads steadily climbs.

习近平上台后，此类提议几乎完全停止了，他奉行的外交政策要激进得多。他主导了中国军队的全面现代化，包括研发和部署新型核导弹、潜艇和轰炸机。与此同时，中国核弹头的拥有量稳步增加。

The White House believes that China’s recent offer is a distraction from its broader unwillingness to engage diplomatically on the nuclear portfolio, including its own aggressive buildup. The Biden administration is wrestling with how it can deter both China and Russia without touching off a destabilizing three-way arms race. Jake Sullivan, Mr. Biden’s national security adviser, publicly invited the two nations last summer to hold nuclear arms control deliberations without preconditions. Russia dismissed the offer outright, while China agreed to preliminary talks. At a follow-on meeting in November, the United States proposed possible measures to manage nuclear risks, such as an agreement to notify one another when their militaries test-launch ballistic missiles.

白宫认为，中国最近的提议是为了转移对其在核议程，包括在其咄咄逼人的核武库增长问题上普遍无意进行外交接触的关注。拜登政府正在考虑要如何遏制中国和俄罗斯，同时又不至于引发破坏稳定的三方军备竞赛。去年夏天的时候，拜登的国家安全顾问杰克·沙利文曾公开邀请这两个国家举行不设先决条件的核军备控制磋商。俄罗斯直接拒绝了这一提议，而中国同意进行初步会谈。在去年11月的一次后续会议上，美国提出了管理核风险的可行措施，比如同意在试射弹道导弹时相互通报。

“The P.R.C. has yet to respond or show interest in engaging substantively on these proposals,” a National Security Council spokeswoman, using the abbreviation for the country’s formal name, the People’s Republic of China, said in a written response to questions about Beijing’s recent offer. “This P.R.C. behavior calls into question the aims behinds the P.R.C.’s call for discussions of a no-first-use treaty.”

“中华人民共和国尚未做出回应，也未表现出对这些提议进行实质性探讨的兴趣，”国家安全委员会的发言人在书面答复有关北京最近提议的问题时说。“中国的这一行为，让人对其呼吁讨论不首先使用核武器条约背后的目的产生怀疑。”

Some argue the Biden administration should take Beijing’s offer at face value. “China genuinely believes that any serious nuclear arms control discussion needs to start with no-first-use,” said Tong Zhao, a nuclear expert focused on China at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “From Beijing’s view, that’s the most effective way to reduce the role of nuclear weapons.”

也有人认为，拜登政府应该接受北京的提议。“中国真心认为，任何严肃的核军备控制讨论都需要从不首先使用核武器开始，”卡内基国际和平研究院研究中国核问题的专家赵通表示。“在北京看来，这是减少核武器作用的最有效方式。”

Even if it is a strategic gambit, engaging with China and other nuclear nations on first-use talks could be a crucial step in establishing critical guardrails for the new nuclear era. It would be a major breakthrough for Washington to get China to the table for arms control talks. It could also help jolt the stalled relations between the United States and Russia, which together control nearly 90 percent of the world’s nuclear warheads.

即使这是一种战略策略，与中国和其他核国家就首次使用核武器的谈判进行接触也可能是为新核时代建立关键护栏的关键一步。对华盛顿来说，让中国坐到军控谈判桌前将是一个重大突破。它还有助于重振美俄之间停滞不前的关系，两国控制着全球近90%的核弹头。

“U.S. administrations have not responded with great alacrity or interest to Chinese outreach on the question of no-first-use,” said Steve Andreasen, who served as Mr. Clinton’s director for defense policy and arms control on the National Security Council. “But as we look forward into … the increasing U.S. national interest in engaging China in all things nuclear, we’re going to have to cross the Rubicon on this issue.”

“对于中国在不首先使用核武器问题上的主动提议，美国历届政府并没有做出非常积极或感兴趣的回应，”曾在克林顿政府的国家安全委员会担任国防政策和军备控制主任的史蒂夫·安德烈亚森说道。“但当我们看到以后……在所有核问题上与中国进行接触越来越符合美国的利益，我们将不得不在这个问题上有所行动。”

It’s true that it’s not an easy time for trust-building exercises; the current level of mistrust between Chinese and American military intentions is deep. Speaking to Congress in March, Gen. Anthony Cotton, commander of all U.S. nuclear forces, suggested that China’s rapid nuclear expansion indicated its no-first-use policy was no longer credible. The Pentagon wrote in an October report that, despite China’s rhetoric, Beijing might consider using nuclear weapons first anyway during a crisis if it came down to the survival of Mr. Xi’s regime, such as defeat in a war with Taiwan. It also remains unclear how exactly China would respond if its nuclear forces were hit during a conflict. Would that trigger Beijing’s nuclear use? “Unknown,” the Pentagon said in the report.

诚然，眼下并非建立信任的好时机；目前中美在军事意图上的不信任很深。今年3月，美国核武部队指挥官安东尼·科顿将军在国会发表讲话时表示，中国的快速核扩张表明，其不首先使用核武器的政策不再可信。五角大楼在去年10月份的一份报告中写道，尽管中国嘴上这样说，但如果事关习近平政权的生死存亡，比如在与台湾的战争中战败，北京方面可能会考虑在危机期间首先使用核武器。目前也不清楚，如果中国的核力量在冲突中遭到打击，中国将如何应对。这会引发北京动用核武器吗？“未知，”五角大楼在报告中写道。

Talking through these points of contention may help Beijing and Washington understand and appreciate the factors that go into formulating the finer points of each other’s nuclear policy. The very process of dialogue and diplomacy can help the Chinese hear American concerns, and vice versa. Given the widening gulf of fear and suspicion between the two nations around Taiwan, there is no better moment for them to sit down and discuss what constitutes a credible no-first-use commitment.

通过讨论这些存在争议的地方，或许有助于北京和华盛顿理解在制定彼此核政策细节时需要考虑的因素。对话和外交的过程可以帮助中国听到美国的关切，反之亦然。鉴于两国在台湾问题上日益扩大的恐惧和怀疑鸿沟，对双方来说，现在是坐下来讨论什么是可信的不首先使用承诺的最佳时机。

It may be that an unequivocal no-first-use pledge ends up being impossible. The talks may not result in a deal anyone can agree upon, and even if a deal were to be reached, it would be impossible to verify, meaning it would be more symbolic than substantive. But that doesn’t mean Washington shouldn’t take up Beijing’s invitation. In the increasingly endangered world of nuclear diplomacy, discussions on one treaty can still set the table for another. New START, the only remaining major arms control agreement between the United States and Russia, was built on the foundation of the original START I, which was signed two decades earlier.

或许，最终并不能达成明确的不首先使用核武器的承诺。谈判可能不会达成所有人都同意的协议，而且即使达成了协议，也可能无法查证核实，这意味着它的象征意义大于实质意义。但这并不意味着华盛顿不应接受北京的邀请。在日益岌岌可危的核外交世界里，对一项条约的讨论仍能为另一项条约的达成铺平道路。《新削减战略武器条约》是美俄之间目前仅存的主要军控协议，它建立在20年前签署的最初的《削减和限制进攻性战略武器条约》基础之上。

Under Mr. Xi, China appears to have left its policy of minimum deterrence behind. If the Biden administration is serious about arms control, it’s time to look for common ground with Beijing to build new agreements for a safer future.

习近平上台后，中国似乎已经放弃了保持最低核威慑的政策。如果拜登政府对军备控制是认真的，那么现在是时候与北京寻求共同点，为一个更安全的未来达成新的协议了。